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O. INTRODUCTION 
This report summarizes the results of research into the chan-
ging patterns of direct corporate control of employment in Aust-
ria between 1973 and 1981. The starting point of this research 
has been the fact that while geographers have widely discussed 
patterns of corporate control and their impact on both headquar-
ters locations and regions dominated by branch plants (cf. Pred, 
1976; Hayter and Watts, 1984; Watts, 1980; Westaway, 1974, Graber 
et al, 1986), we have rather limited empirical information about 
patterns of corporate control. Much effort has been invested in 
empirical analyses of the location of corporate headquarters 
(Semple, 1973; Borchert, 1978; Semple and Phipps, 1982; Semple, 
Green and Martz, 1985; Cohen, 1978), and a number of studies have 
been made of regions dominated by branch plants in order to de-
termine the impact of branch plants on the local economy (Erick-
son, 1981; Firn, 1975; Dicken, 1976; Smith, 1979; Watts, 1981). 
None of these studies, however, have been based on comprehensive 
information about exactly which headquarter locations control 
which branch plants. The Austrian census of industry of 1973 and 
1981 provides complete information about the number of jobs con-
trolled in plants in each of 82 districts, providing a 82 by 82 
interaction matrix of organizational control. These data are fur-
thermore disaggregated by economic sectors. 
Since these data represent a proxy for the geography of intra-
national direct investment, and are available at two points in 
time, it was thought that they could be used to examine some 
aspects of the theory of direct investment (cf. Sheppard, 1984). 
Theories of direct investment are predicated on the assumption 
that direct investment is increasing over time; they are theories 
of investment rather than disinvestment. An examination of the 
Austrian situation, however, showed that external and internal 
developments during this period have meant that disinvestment, or 
disintegration, is as important a trend as further investment; a 
point that has been observed in other contexts. 
The orientation of the study, then, has been to attempt to 
explain the differing strategies of organizational change observ-
able in different industries, and to examine the spatial ramifi-
cations of these changes in the case of Austria. It then becomes 
possible to ask, for example, whether an industry in trouble 
generally simply closes branch plants in peripheral regions, as 
is frequently argued, or whether other strategies of disintegra-
tion rather than closure are followed. Since the Austrian economy 
has important manufacturing industries which are owned by the 
state, it is also possible to make institutional comparisons not 
only between autonomous firms and multi-regional firms, but also 
between privately owned and state enterprises. 
The report is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines a con-
ceptualization which can be used to explain changes in the orga-
nizational structure and location of commodity production based 
on changes in the global distribution of economic activities, in 
the nature of demand, and in the production processes being adop-
ted. Section 2 summarizes the nature and limitations of the data. 
Sections 3 to 8 provide a detailed geographical analysis of chan-
ges in the size and organizational control of employment for six 
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sectors in Austria between 1973 and 1981. Section 9 summarises 
the empirical results. 
1. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
During the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s Austria experi-
enced a deconcentration of industry, largely as a result of the 
establishment of branch plants in rural areas. The result of this 
was the addition of a new spatial division of labor within large 
multilocational enterprises to the traditional concentration of 
manufacturing jobs in the old industrial areas. The expanded 
scale of enterprises led to a spatial separation of production 
from control, using standardized technologies to take advantage 
of unskilled labor in the peripheral regions of Austria in produ-
cing for mass markets. These patterns may be interpreted as the 
spatial ramifications of the expansion of fordist production 
methods during the post-war boom (cf. Toedtling, 1983; 1984). 
During the 1970s a series of changes occurred affecting the 
profitability of the industries and production methods found in 
industrialized nations. First, there was an increase in the de-
gree of international competition. In particular, newly industri-
alizing countries (NICs) emerged, capable of being highly compe-
titive with European firms in sectors using labor and resource 
intensive production methods. Japanese firms also successfully 
entered European wage goods markets, and there was an increased 
degree of competition among the developed countries (Amin and 
Smith, 1986). Second, consumer demand in the industrialized coun-
tries became more sophisticated and differentiated. Third, rapid 
technological changes were occurring. New production technologies 
such as micro-processors have allowed for more flexibility in 
production and lower set-up costs for re-tooling a production 
line in order to produce a new variant of some product. This 
reduces the degree to which scale economies can be realized from 
operating large plants or long production runs. Communications 
technologies, based on the same innovations in information pro-
cessing, have made the coordination of production in different 
facilities in different places much easier. Changes in production 
levels or unanticipated problems at individual plants can be 
reported rapidly, and central managers can immediately respond 
with altered production plans for other facilities which take 
these changes into account. 
These three closely related developments (cf. Storper and 
Walker, 1984) put pressure for restructuring on the Austrian 
economy in general, with particular impact in certain sectors. In 
analyzing the effect of these pressures on the location and orga-
nizational structure of different economic sectors in Austria, it 
is necessary to conceptualize the determinants of organizational 
and geographical change. 
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1.1 Organizational Change 
1.1.1 Disintegration 
Organizational change refers to changes in the structure of 
ownership and organizational control in a sector. Changes in 
organizational control reflect processes of integration or disin-
tegration. Whereas integration (growth of enterprises, e.g. via 
mergers and acquisitions) has traditionally been the dominant 
mode of organizational change, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that disintegration has become much more commonplace in 
recent years (Friedman, 1977; Scott, 1983; 1986; Cowling, 1986; 
Holmes, 1986; Shutt and Whittingdon, 1986). By disintegration we 
mean a change from wholly owned production facilities to appa-
rently autonomous ones. The latter can take a number of forms; 
ranging from fully autonomous firms, through autonomous firms 
which are dependent on orders from larger corporations, to sub-
contractors, franchises, and production under licence. The pro-
cess of disintegration is also varied, including; worker or ma-
nagement buy-outs of subsidiaries, buy-outs by other entrepre-
neurs, and legal changes of ownership without any change in con-
trol. The data available to us do not allow any distinction among 
these possibilities to be made, so all of them will simply be 
referred to as a disintegration of organizational control. 
We do wish to emphasize, however, that there is an important 
distinction between direct control and ownership. This can be 
seen in its clearest form when a corporation converts some subsi-
diary into a legally autonomous unit while still retaining full 
financial ownership, a case of disintegration without any decent-
ralization of financial control. In addition, many individual 
firms may be less independent than their legal status would im-
ply. Legally autonomous sub-contractors, for example, can be 
dependent to various degrees on the firms to which they are under 
contract (cf. Holmes, 1986). Since dependency in this sense can-
not be observed in our data, we restrict ourselves to a discus-
sion of changes in direct organizational control over production. 
As a consequence, we would then expect our interpretations to 
underestimate the degree of economic dependency between plants 
and regions. 
1.1.2 Pressure to Restructure 
The profitability of Austrian firms in any given sector of the 
economy will depend on both the degree of competition and levels 
of demand for its products. Changes in the degree of competition 
during this period are largely related to competition from ab-
road. This in turn is related to the structure of the production 
process, which can be examined in terms of neo-factor proportion 
theory (Maier and Todtling, 1985). Foreign competition would be 
expected to be greatest in those sectors where there is a high 
reliance on unskilled labor. The relocation of industry in the 
1970s was dominated by movements of those parts of the production 
process requiring large amounts of unskilled labor to locations 
in the third world and in the periphery of the developed world 
with low labor costs (Froebel et al., 1980; Storper and Walker, 
4 
1981). Sectors where this kind of production is most prevalent 
would be under greatest competition from these new locations. 
The growth of demand would depend on the rate of expansion of 
domestic demand and on export possibilities to foreign markets. 
In the 1970s consumer demand was no longer expanding at a rapid 
rate either in Austria or in other West European countries, pla-
cing particular pressure on services and wage good industries. 
Expanded demand for capital goods in the NICs in particular was a 
potential compensating factor for capital goods industries, al-
though Austria was not as well placed to take advantage of this 
as were other nations with stronger links to the NICs. 
1.1.3 Production Characteristics and the Speed and Nature of 
Organizational Response 
The reaction to be expected under pressure to restructure is 
also related to the kind of production processes used in a sec-
tor. In order to approximate this, we differentiate between the 
degree of capital intensity of production, and the degree to 
which unskilled labor is used; dimensions which in turn reflect 
differences in the types of labor process used in production (for 
a classification of the latter see Storper and Walker, 1984). 
These two factors first of all influence the entry and exit bar-
riers in a sector. Capital intensive industries exhibit high 
inertia due to the expensive fixed costs associated with opening 
a new plant or closing an old one; although the costs of closure 
depend on the degree to which fixed capital has already been 
depreciated. This inertia is both due to the cost of fixed capi-
tal, and to the fact that capital intensive industries tend to 
have considerable scale economies making it necessary to operate 
large plants in order to be competitive. Labor intensive indu-
stries using mostly skilled labor face fewer fixed capital costs, 
but do face the fixed costs of training labor which makes entry 
or exit more expensive than in industries relying on unskilled 
labor. These relationships are summarized in Table 1.1. 
TABLE 1.1 Entr and exit barriers for different t es of 
industries 
LABOR 
INTENSIVE 
CAPITAL 
INTENSIVE 
SKILLED LABOR 
medium entry and 
exit barriers 
high entry and 
exit barriers 
UNSKILLED LABOR 
low entry and 
exit barriers 
high entry and 
exit barriers 
We expect that the nature of entry and exit barriers would 
influence the observed response to pressure for restructuring. 
Industries with high entry and exit barriers would respond more 
slowly, and the nature of the response to pressure for restructu-
ring is more likely to be a concentration of capital and owner-
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ship. The scale economies of capital intensive production mean 
that plant size must continue to remain high when firms are ope-
rating at less than full capacity. Thus when a crisis of profita-
bility occurs, corporations will respond by either undercutting 
their competitors thus closing them down, or by engineering take-
overs followed with branch plant closures to rationalize produc-
tion into a fewer number of facilities operating at closer to 
full capacity. Industries with low entry and exit barriers would 
show a high turnover of plants, with less pressure for mergers 
and concentration of capital because scale economies are lower. 
In the empirical work to be reported below, we divide manufac-
turing into the four categories of Table 1.1 in order to assess 
the usefulness of these distinctions in accounting for the geo-
graphy of corporate control. Since we are examining a period of 
rapid technological changes, however, it is also necessary to 
take into account the possible effects of the new production and 
communication technologies on the production processes used in 
different industries and on the possibilities for organizational 
restructuring. Labor intensive industries are most likely to 
benefit from the new methods of flexible automation, and this is 
likely to be particularly the case where skilled workers are 
used. In the higher skilled labor intensive industries, reloca-
tion of production to low wage locations is, at least to date, 
relatively difficult (but see Scott, 1987) and greater savings 
can be made by replacing skilled labor. Capital intensive sectors 
with stable demand are likely to benefit least because high le-
vels of automation have already been achieved, and stable demand 
means that there is less need for flexible production processes. 
In mass production industries such as paper or steel therefore, 
strategies of maintaining scale economies and reducing production 
costs are more likely. In general, however, the new technologies 
reduce scale economies and make disaggregated production systems, 
with each stage in the production process located where it can be 
carried out most profitably, easier to coordinate. 
The nature of demand will generally affect the organizational 
strategy followed in an industry. Unpredictable demand can create 
considerable costs for large production facilities, and the risks 
associated with this uncertainty can be reduced by passing it on 
to sub-contractors (Scott, 1983, 1986; Holmes, 1986). Thus there 
is more pressure to disintegrate if demand is unstable. Machinery 
and specialty goods industries, where demand is unstable, custom 
designs are common, and production runs are typically short 
(Schoenberger, 1985), benefit from the flexibility of the new 
technology. Disintegrated production is therefore more probable 
in such cases. 
Another reason for disintegration is to reduce labor costs. 
Over the years, labor unions have successfully increased wages 
for their members in large corporations; due to both the ease of 
organizing the workforce in such large institutions, and the 
ability of oligopolistic corporations to pass cost increases due 
to higher wages on to the consumer through price increases. Tur-
ning production over to apparently autonomous small firms opera-
ting under more openly competitive conditions both reduces the 
bargaining power of labor unions and also subjects the wages of a 
proportion of the workforce to pressures of the open market 
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(Friedman, 1977; Scott, 1983; Holmes, 1986; Shutt and Whitting-
don, 1986). According to this theory, pressure to disintegrate 
will be higher in those labor intensive industries and enterpri-
ses where unions are more active. One important feature of the 
Austrian economy in the 1970s was a distinction between the labor 
practices of state run enterprises and those of private enterpri-
ses. In the 1970s the socialist government pursued a policy of 
'labor hoarding', whereby layoffs and redundancies were minimized 
as part of a more general full employment policy. As will be 
seen, the contrast between this and the practices of private 
enterprises seeking to reduce their labor costs has had an ob-
servable impact on different organizational strategies followed 
in different industries. 
Finally, Scott (1983) has argued that the location pattern of 
plants in an industry affects the profitability of a strategy of 
disintegration. Since disintegration increases the linkages bet-
ween separate plants, industries where many related plants are 
already clustered together are more likely to be ones where fur-
ther disintegration occurs. The traditional association of spa-
tial clustering and disintegrated production captured in the 
concept of localization economies has, however, been questioned 
(Holmes, 1986). 
1.2 Geographical Change 
In general, we can observe two types of changes in the econo-
mic geography of Austria between 1973 and 1981: changes in the 
location of employment in a particular industry, and changes in 
the configuration of organizational control. We will be directing 
more attention to the latter process, both looking at how inte-
gration and disintegration processes influence the mix of autono-
mous firms, branch plants and headquarters in a region, and at 
changes in the internal spatial division of labor within multi-
regional firms. A systematic relation will be sought between the 
type of integration or disintegration going on (such as horizon-
tal, vertical or diversified integration, on the one hand, or 
sub-contracting, devolvement or disintegration on the other: 
Dicken, 1976; Wood, 1978; Watts, 1981; Massey, 1984; Holmes, 
1986; Shutt and Whittingdon, 1986) and these spatial characteri-
stics. 
In attempting to understand these changes, however, it is 
necessary to take into account both the spatial structure of 
employment and ownership in 1973 and the likely effects of 
organizational and employment changes in the industry as a whole 
on these structures. The spatial structure in 1973 is important 
because, as Scott indicates, the spatial clustering of plants may 
have an influence on organizational change. It is also important 
because the spatial division of labor and control already extant 
in 1973 delimits the options available to firms after that point 
in time. 
Geographical changes are likely to be difficult to predict. 
First, the economic geography of Austria is complex. Neighboring 
districts can have very different economic structures because of 
the complex physical geography of the country. Contiguous regions 
7 
may not be closely linked together because a mountain range lies 
in between. As a result there is considerable small scale varia-
tion in economic characteristics making it hard to discern 
broader regional patterns. In addition, the districts used in 
this analysis are small, and considerable changes can be observed 
simply as a result of actions taken with respect to a single 
plant. As a result, changes that may be dependent on the peculiar 
characteristics of a particular plant, such as a history of poor 
management in a single enterprise, cannot easily be filtered out 
from more systematic trends. For both of these reasons, the small 
size of our spatial units and the difficulty of aggregating them 
together, there is likely to be a significant amount of variation 
which is unexplainable by the general arguments used in this 
paper. It is not likely, therefore, that we will have a proper 
idea of the power of our explanatory concepts until this analysis 
is complemented by intensive case studies of those enterprises 
whose actions seem unexplainable. Only with case studies will it 
be possible to determine whether such cases are peculiar because 
they are special cases, or whether their peculiarity reflects 
significant inadequacies in our conceptual apparatus. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, however, there clearly are 
cases where the general economic health of a region seems to 
affect actions of firms in that region, no matter which sector 
they belong to. In addition, the organizational structure extant 
in a region will clearly affect the options available to firms 
there. 
Autonomous firms are more likely to have the power to make 
their own decisions about change (limited by the degree to which 
they may be dependent on particular customers; see previous 
section). Yet, they must rely on their own resources and economic 
prosperity at that location in order to finance, or raise capital 
to finance, such changes. The degree of decision-making autonomy 
is then constrained by limited resources. Branch plants have more 
resources available, because in principle they can draw on the 
financial resources and prosperity of the multi-regional corpora-
tion at all locations where it operates in order to underwrite 
change. Yet they have much less autonomy: profitable branches may 
be run down, or unprofitable ones subsidized, if that suits the 
purposes of the parent enterprise. In short, greater potential 
resources are constrained by less decision-making power, because 
the parent enterprise can act to shield a branch plant from its 
local economic environment. 
The result is that the goals of, and means available to, a 
firm which is responding to pressure for restructuring are more 
closely related to the economic conditions in the local region 
(such as availability of inputs, contact potential and access to 
information) if it is autonomous than if it is part of a multi-
regional enterprise. The implications of this for regional 
economic change have been widely discussed in the literature 
(Firn, 1975; Dicken, 1976; Lever, 1978; Smith, 1979; Muller, 
1981). 
In Austria, an important additional dimension to organizati-
onal structure is the existence of state enterprises. State 
enterprises, like multi-regional firms, have resources that need 
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not be limited to the local situation, In addition, the goals 
driving response to pressure for restructuring are formulated by 
an institution whose interests transcend the local situation. 
Unlike private multi-regional firms, however, these goals are not 
restricted to questions of profitability because the state has to 
coordinate economic growth with social programs. As mentioned 
above, a particularly important goal of the socialist government 
in the 1970s was maintaining employment. In addition, we would 
expect the state to be more sensitive to the negative consequen-
ces of economic change on the local region than a private corpo-
ration. The social costs of such change are a responsibility of 
the state, and there are political costs as well for a socialist 
government faced with potential economic decline in traditional 
industrial and working class regions. 
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2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 The Control Matrix 
The data for this research stem from the industrial census 
carried out by the Austrian Bureau of Statistics in 1973 and 
1981. This survey of all non-agricultural plants and enterprises 
in Austria collected information on: the location of each plant, 
the enterprise to which it belongs, a classification into econo-
mic sectors based on the nature of the principal product of the 
plant, the location of the headquarters of the enterprise, and 
the number of workers employed in the plant. These data were then 
aggregated by enterprise and economic sector to derive a matrix 
of organizational control for each sector in each year. 
The nature of the control matrix is shown in Figure 2.1. Here, 
x is the number of jobs in plants located in district j which 
are controlled by firms headquartered in district i. In the case 
of the off-diagonal elements of this matrix, the entry unambigu-
ously refers to organizational linkages among plants and firms 
controlled by multi-regional firms. The diagonal elements, 
however, represent a mixture of intra- and inter- firm organiza-
tional links. The diagonal elements include employment in: 
Autonomous single plant firms, headquarters and branch plants of 
those multi-plant firms where all plants are located in the same 
district, headquarters of multi-regional firms headquartered in 
the district, and branch plants of these multi-regional firms 
which are located in the same district as the headquarters. As a 
consequence, during the process of aggregating multi-regional 
enterprise data into sectors we had to define branch plants for 
the purposes of this analysis as plants located in a district 
other than that occupied by the headquarters of the enterprise, 
and define headquarters employment as all employment in the same 
district as the headquarters. Similarly, all enterprises with all 
of their employment in just one district were defined as simply 
autonomous firms. 
The row sums X , represent the total number of jobs con-
trolled by headquarters in district i, the kind of data often 
used in studies of headquarters locations (cf. Borchert, 1978). 
The column sums, X represent the total number of jobs in 
district j. An entry in the matrix refers to the existence of 
direct organizational control, but the data clearly do not 
include all forms of intra-corporate relations. Recall that firms 
can appear to be independent according to these data while they 
are still financially dependent on some parent corporation; an 
arrangement that is particularly common in financial holding 
companies. 
The data are available for 82 "politische Bezirke'', hereafter 
referred to as districts, representing a fine regional subdivi-
sion of Austria including as separate districts the major cities 
together with their immediate hinterland (Figure 2.2). These 
districts approximate a functional regionalization of the nation 
according to local labor markets, with districts generally 
organized around a city or town that represents the center of the 
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labor market. In the case of the larger agglomerations local 
labor market boundaries do clearly transcend the boundaries of a 
single district. In these cases we attempted to compensate for 
this by aggregating districts of the immediate hinterland toge-
ther with districts representing the cities themselves. Such 
aggregations also reduce the likehood that suburbanization moves 
by industry might turn up as shifts in the geography of organiza-
tional control. The definition of what constitutes a multi-
regional firm in this study, and the general importance of multi-
regional firms, are both determined by the size of these dist-
ricts, much as migration rates depend on the size of the regions 
used in a migration study. 
2.2 Choice of Economic Sectors 
The sectors analyzed in this study are: Manufacturing; fi-
nance, insurance and producer services; and wholesaling and re-
tailing. While data were available for the other sectors of the 
economy they were eliminated from the study. For reasons of con-
sistency and comparability we wished to restrict ourselves to 
these sectors where a headquarters location that controls deci-
sion-making over production can clearly be identified, and where 
the institutions involved are multi-regional enterprises whose 
activities are oriented towards and subject to the operation of 
the private market. 
The mining and water supply and transportation sectors involve 
such a high level of public ownership that they are insulated 
from the private economy and are not subject to market forces. As 
a result they are difficult to interpret using the conceptualiza-
tion developed for this study. Tourism shows virtually no exter-
nal control because it is dominated by individual autonomous 
hotels and inns. Construction was eliminated because the defini-
tion of a production plant, a construction site, is a temporary 
facility, making it distinctly different from other sectors. 
Finally the sector including public and private personal services 
was eliminated because it is dominated by the public sector. In 
general, it is hard to identify the functional headquarters of 
public services because they are simply recorded as being con-
trolled by the relevant federal ministry. In addition this 
includes such obviously special cases as the armed forces. 
We then subdivided the manufacturing sector according to the 
technological requirements of the different industries. Since 
there is reason to believe that the degree of capital intensity 
and the degree to which skilled workers are required represent 
important differentiating characteristics with respect to organi-
zational behavior (see section 1), these were used to divide 
manufacturing industries into four categories (Table 2.1). In 
performing this classification, capital intensity was measured by 
the capital to labor ratio in an industry, and skilled workers by 
the ratio of the sum of white collar and craft workers to the 
total labor force of the industry. 
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TABLE 2.1: Sub-division of manufacturing 
SKILLED LABOR 
LABOR 
INTENSIVE 
CAPITAL 
INTENSIVE 
metal products 
wood products 
optical instruments 
transportation equipment 
sports equipment 
oil refining 
stone and glass 
food manufacturing 
machinery 
metal processing 
printing and publishing 
This gave us then six sectors to analyze; 
sectors, financial and producer services, 
wholesaling. 
UNSKILLED LABOR 
textiles 
clothing 
shoe manufacture 
leather 
wood processing 
iron and steel 
chemicals 
plastics 
electrical equipment 
paper 
four manufacturing 
and retailing and 
2.3 Summary of Data Analysis 
A series of measures were calculated in an effort to gain 
insight into the changing spatial structure of organizational 
control. General indices comparing the degree of external control 
exerted on a district (inward control) with the degree of exter-
nal control exerted from that district elsewhere (outward con-
trol) were calculated in order to measure the degree of control 
that a district has over other districts. These showed that 
indeed the principal cities which had the largest number of 
headquarters tended to exert the most control; but that the 
dominance of these districts in terms of headquarters was mitiga-
ted by the fact that they also contain many branch plants of 
firms headquartered elsewhere. In short, there are high levels of 
cross-investment between the major urban centers. As a result, 
the ratio of outward to inward control was sometimes as high in 
rural peripheral areas as in major cities (cf. Figure 2.3: Maps 
for all sectors in 1973 and 1981 are available from the authors). 
The geographical patterns of control were examined in a number 
of ways. Maps of the largest flows show the dominant patterns of 
control (cf. Figure 2.4). These were computed by ranking the non-
diagonal elements of the control matrix from largest to smallest 
and retaining those largest flows that together constitute 75% of 
all external control. These turned out to be most useful in 
describing the geographical consequences of changing organizatio-
nal structure, and are used extensively in the empirical analy-
sis. Maps showing for each district the other district that 
exerted the largest external control over it, thus hierarchically 
dominating it, were drawn to indicate the hierarchical structure 
of control (Figure 2.5; cf. Nystuen and Dacey, 1961). These maps, 
however, provided little new information. Wind maps (cf. Tobler, 
1981), indicating the mean geographical direction from which 
- 12 -
external control into each district comes, gave an indication of 
the relative influence of the various sources of external control 
on each district (cf. Figure 2.6), but again added little to 
other maps (cf. Figure 2.4). Finally, an examination of both 
direct and indirect control patterns was carried out using 
potential theory and eigenvector analysis, but again bringing 
little additional insight. 
Other than maps of the major control links, the most fruitful 
material for helping understand the restructuring of organizatio-
nal and geographical control between 1973 and 1981 were computa-
tions of three kinds of changes for each district. Changes in the 
main diagonal of the control matrix for any sector between 1973 
and 1981, DIAG, represent changes in the number of jobs in 
autonomous firms. Changes in the number of jobs controlled from 
outside, ECJ (the column sum less the main diagonal), represent 
changes in branch plant employment. Changes in the number of jobs 
that firms headquartered in the district control elsewhere, ACJ 
(the row sum less the main diagonal), represent changes in the 
fortunes of multi-regional firms headquartered here and thus in 
the degree of organizational control exerted from the district. 
These three numbers can be used to develop an interpretation 
scheme to help identify the kinds of changes occurring in a 
district. For example, the takeover of a local autonomous firm in 
a district by a corporation headquartered elsewhere would lead to 
a decline in DIAG and an increase in ECJ in that district; 
whereas the simple closing of branch plants would result in a 
decrease of ECJ with no effect on DIAG or ACJ. A large number of 
scenarios, representing various combinations of changes of 
ownership, of direct investment strategies and of branch plant 
employment can be constructed. Some of the simpler and most 
pertinent ones, together with an indication of their impact on 
DIAG, ECJ and ACJ, are provided in Table 2.2. These scenarios 
represented the basis on which we used ACJ, ECJ and DIAG to 
interpret the kinds of changes likely to be occurring in any 
given district. 
Note that these scenarios are most accurate if they are 
applied to individual plants. For a district as a whole, the 
observed aggregate changes for all plants located there may not 
be consistent with the relevant interpretation unless all plants 
behave similarly, or one plant dominates the others in terms of 
its employment. The problems that aggregation poses for consis-
tent interpretation is mitigated in this study by the small size 
of the districts, but nevertheless these interpretations must be 
used with caution. For this reason, we only attempted to inter-
pret changes in those districts where there was a large absolute 
change in at least one of the three categories. Furthermore when 
alternative scenarios were suggested by the data we used ancil-
lary information to choose between them. If this still did not 
narrow the possibilities down to one scenario, we chose that one 
which was the simplest. 
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2.4 Structure of Empirical Sections 
The following six sections describe the empirical results of 
this analysis. Each section begins with a discussion of the 
characteristics of that sector, together with our expectations 
about the kind of organizational and employment changes which we 
would expect. We examine external pressure to restructure, entry 
and exit barriers, the potential impact of new technology, and 
the spatial division of labor. We then go on to analyze the 
patterns of employment and control in 1973, and the changes in 
these patterns between 1973 and 1981. 
Figure 2.1: The Control Matrix 
sources 
of 
control 
Column 
sums 
i • 1 
2 
3 
.. 
districts in which jobs are controlled 
i· 1 2 3 .o( .... 
:I·· 1J 
Row 
sum 
Xz .. 
x •• 
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Figure 2.2: Politische Bezirke (districts) of Austria 
1. Eisenstadt/hinterland 23. Hol1abrun 45. Rohrbach 6 7. Radkersburg 
2. GLissing 24. Horn 46. Scharding 68. Voitsberg 
3. Jennersdorf 25. Korneuburg 47. Urfahr 69. Weiz 
4. Mattersburg 26. L ilienfeld 48. Vock lab ruck 70. lnnsbruck 
S. Neusiedl am See 27. Melk 49. Salzburg/hinterland 71. lmst 
6 . Oberpu 1 lendorf 28. M bl.e1L1ach 50. Hallein 72 . Kitzbuhel 
7. 0berwart 29. Neunkirchen 51 . St Johann im Pongau 73. Kufstein 
8 . Klagenfurt/hinterland 30. Scr1eibbs 52. Tamsweg 74. Landeck 
9. Villoch/hinterland 31 . Tulln 53. Zell am See 75. Lienz 
1 0. Hermagor 32. Waidhofen/Thaya 54. Graz/hinterland 76. Reutte 
11. 3arikl Veit a. d. man 33. Zwettl ~~- Bruck a.d. Mur 77. Schwaz 
12. Spittal a. d. Drau 34. Linz/hinterland 56. Deutschlandsberg 78. B luueriz 
13. Vblkermarkt 35. Steyr/hinterland 57. Feldbach 79. Bregenz 
1 4. Wolf sburg 36. Wels/hinterland 58. Fursterifeld 80. Dornbirn 
15. K.rems/hinter land 37. Braunau am Inn 59. Hartberg 81. Feldkirch 
16. S1. Pullen/hinterland 38. Eferding 60. Judenberg 82. Vienna/htland 
17. Waidhofen a. d. Ybbs 39. Freistadt 61 . Knittelfeld 
18. Wiener Neustadt/htld 40. Gmunden 62. Leibnitz 
19. Baden 41. Grieskirchen 63. Leoben 
20. Bruck a. d. Leitha 42. Kirchdorf a.d. Krems 64. L iezen 
2 1 . !3i:insersdorf 43. Perg 65. MUrzusch lag 
22. GmUnd 44. Reid im lnnkreis 66. I"1urau 
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Figure 2.3: Index of Control, all Manufacturing, 1973 
r:-::-7 <05 L.:..;_J . t<<:J 0.51-0 . 75 F:[Hdo. 76-o. 9 111 .01-1 .25 ->1 .25 
Figure 2.4: Largest Control Links, all Manufacturing, 1973 
- >9700 --3800-7700 -2100-3000 
1000-1900 
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Figure 2.5: Chains of Dominant Control, all Manufacturing, 1973 
- >9700 
--3800-7700 - 2,00-3000 
-<lOOO 
Figure 2. 6: Wind Maps of Organizational Control, all Manufacturing, 19 73 
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Table 2.2. Interpretation Scheme for Changes in Control and Depdendency 
Cat. Type of chanqe 
A 
E 
C 
D 
I 
F 
H 
G 
K 
L 
p 
M 
D 
N 
External takeover of local independent 
firm 
Purchase of externally controlled 
branch by local independent firm 
Closinq of branch plant in reqion 
Expansion (openinql of branch plant in 
reqion 
Movement of headquarter out of reqion 
(leavinq branch plant> 
Movement of headquarter function into 
reqion to join a branch plant 
Movement of headquarter out of reqion 
(leavinq nothinq) 
Movement of headquarter function into 
reqion as autonomous unit 
Closinq of local firm 
Expansion (openinql of local firm 
Reqional headquarter: decline of branch 
plant employment outside reqion 
Reqional headquarter: expansion of 
branch plant employment outside reqion 
Movement of 
headquarter 
branch plant from 
Movement of branch plant to headquarter 
ACJ ECJ DIAG 
() 
0 
0 
0 
( - ) 
( +) 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
NOTE: Terms in brackets would be O if there are no branch plants 
in other reqions. 
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3. LABOR INTENSIVE MANUFACTURING WITH UNSKILLED WORKERS 
This sector includes textiles, clothing, shoe manufacture, 
leather, and wood processing. 
3.1 Sectoral Characteristics 
This sector of manufacturing, with its high demand for un-
skilled workers, was the one under strongest external competition 
in the period 1973-1981, particularly from nations of the third 
world with plentiful supplies of cheap unskilled labor. This can 
be seen in the decline in employment in this sector from 188,065 
to 142,760 employees between 1973 and 1981; a loss of more than 
45,000 jobs (a 24% decline) in eight years. This represents a 
greater decline than in any other sector during this period. 
External competition placed considerable pressure on these 
industries to rationalize production, particularly in those 
locations within Austria where production costs were highest. The 
relatively low exit costs associated with untrained labor and low 
levels of fixed capital mean that this sector is geographically 
more mobile; so a logical response to pressure for restucturing 
would be the closure of plants and the relocation of production 
to locations with cheaper labor both within Austria and abroad. 
The use of unskilled labor would imply that the newly deve-
loped technologies allowing for more flexible production systems 
and for the better coordination of geographically separated 
production systems could have considerable impact in this sector. 
This would be expected to take the form of separating out diffe-
rent parts of the production process and locating them in places 
where they can be most cheaply carried out. The geographical 
decentralization of those parts of the production process which 
can be automated or routinised might then be expected. 
While the relatively low capital requirements of this sector 
mean that there is less pressure for the creation of large 
production facilities, large corporations showing a marked 
internal spatial division of labor emerged in the 1960s and early 
1970s at both the interregional and international scales (Frobel 
et al, 1980). This involved the location of administrative and 
control components of the enterprise in higher order centers and 
production facilties in areas of cheap labor; which in the 
Austrian context would often be rural areas. High pressure for 
restructuring would be expected to lead to major organizational 
and financial changes. It is difficult to predict the general 
direction of organizational changes. The application of new 
technologies to extend the production processes that can be 
automated could act as a centralizing and integrating force; 
although the converse would be the case to the extent that these 
technologies enable the disarticulation of production processes. 
External competition, forcing down prices, would make domestic 
markets more uncertain for Austrian producers. This might exert 
pressure to disintegrate the production process; devolving 
production to legally independent enterprises in order to pass 
the risks of production under uncertainty on to them (Scott, 
1983). However such disintegration of ownership need not imply a 
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disintegration of financial control, since companies can be given 
legal autonomy without divorcing them completely from the parent 
company. We would expect that continued centralization of finan-
cial control would be occurring, but this cannot be evaluated 
from these data. 
Given that the 1970s were a period of decoupling of production 
processes and relocation to cheap labor locations particularly in 
the third world, and given the increased uncertainty of demand 
for domestically manufactured products that the resulting compe-
tition created, it might be expected that the overall balance of 
these contrasting influences would be in favor of branch plant 
closures and disintegration. Indeed the proportion of jobs in 
this sector in Austria as a whole that were externally controlled 
fell from 15.7% to 13.1% between 1973 and 1981. 
3.2 The Geography of Control in 1973 
In 1973 the main areas subject to external control were 
located along the northern and eastern borders of Austria (the 
Waldviertel, Weinviertel, Burgenland and the southern Vienna 
basin; Figure 3.1). The first three of these are mainly areas 
with abundant low skilled labor and low wages. In addition, state 
subsidies were available for new firms locating in these 
districts. The southern Vienna basin is a traditional textile 
manufacturing region, dating back to the 19th century, which 
gradually came under the control of firms headquartered in Vienna 
during the centralization of the textile industry. By far the 
most important center of control was Vienna, controlling 60% of 
all externally controlled jobs. In addition a series of small 
plants were controlled from firms headquartered in Austria's 
second principal textile and clothing manufacturing region, 
Vorarlberg (Figure 3.2). 
3.3 Changes in the Geography of Control 1973-1981 
The most notable change has been the decline of Vienna as a 
center of control; losing 13,000 controlled jobs and reducing its 
overall share of such jobs from 60% to 25.8%. Secondary centers 
also losing control were Waidhofen/Thaya, Graz, Feldkirch and 
Ground (Figure 3.3). Vienna, as a relatively 'expensive' location 
was losing both autonomous and multiregional headquarter activi-
ties during this period. The other losses are in traditional 
locations of the textile industry where older plants were pro-
bably being closed. New centers of control were developing in 
Wiener Neustadt and Krems, and to a lesser extent in Spittal/ 
Drau, Bregenz, Jennersdorf and Dornbirn. 
Two broad kinds of changes could 
ricts where there was a high degree of 
(Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6): 
be observed in those dist-
external control in 1973 
Devolution of external control was the more common pattern, 
involving a change in the form of ownership whereby former branch 
plants become legally autonomus enterprises. This pattern is the 
more common change, generally located in the eastern districts 
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(Mistelbach, Wiener Neustadt, Neunkirchen, Oberwart and Gussing). 
This may be the result of converting branch plants into legally 
autonomous entities, while they continue to remain financially 
linked to the parent corporation, and perhaps just as dependent 
in the parent for financing and strategic planning as before. It 
could also be that headquarter functions have been moved to the 
regions in question, joining a relatively new production facility 
there, while other older branch plants in other regions were 
closed. Other possible explanations are that branch plants were 
simply sold to local entrepreneurs, or that there was a coinci-
dental closing of a branch plant and opening of a new firm in the 
same economic sector in the same region during this time periods. 
It is, however, unlikely that either of these latter events would, 
be common enough to explain the number of changes of this kind 
observed. 
Branch plant closure, the kind of change generally referred to 
in the literature, also occurred although it was less common. 
This was observed in Ground, Waidhofen/Thaya and Leoben (Figures 
3.4, 3.6). The two former districts show changes that are part of 
a general economic decline in the Waldviertel district along the 
border with Czechoslovakia. Possible reasons for branch plant 
closure include; a less organized workforce unable to assemble 
credible resistance to the closure, the higher accessibility 
costs of these peripheral locations, and the possibility that 
these branch plants were originally designed as horizontal 
extensions of production using older machinery and a flexible 
labor force designed to cope with a period of peak demand. The 
subsidies provided by the state to encourage the location of 
branch plants would have encouraged such behavior. 
The rise of Wiener Neustadt as a center of control clearly 
represents a movement of headquarters out of Vienna, because the 
districts now controlled from Wiener Neustadt were formerly 
controlled from Vienna (Figures 3.2, 3.7). During this period, a 
state supported rationalization of the eastern component of the 
textile industry "Textillosung Ost" (textile solution, east) 
occurred, and the shifts to Wiener Neustadt were a part of this 
process. For this same reason, almost all of the organizational 
restructuring of this sector took place in the eastern regions, 
whereas the geography of control emanating out of the other 
textile district, Vorarlberg, showed very little change during 
this period. 
Overall, by 1981 there had been a decline in external depen-
dency in the regions surrounding Vienna (Figure 3.8) partly due 
to disintegration of control and partly due to branch plant 
closure. 
The rationalization of employment in this sector in Vorarlberg 
has been dominated by the decline of employment in autonomous 
plants, while externally controlled employment has changed little 
(Figures 3.5, 3.6). This implies a relative increase in the 
importance of externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all 
jobs controlled from Vorarlberg in the sector. Since 1981, the 
western component of the textile industry has also been substan-
tially restructured through the "Textillosung West", and further 
significant changes have occurred in the eastern region. 
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Figure 3.1: External Dependency: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
Figure 3.2a All Major Control Links: Labor Intensive Manufacturing 
with Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
->2900 --990-2000 -430-730 --144-380 
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Figure 3. 2b Major Control Links from Vienna: Labor Intensive 
Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
->2900 
--990-2000 -430-730 -- 144-380 
Figure 3.2c Major Control Links Excluding Control fran Vienna: Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
->2900 --990-2000 -430-730 -- 144-380 
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Figure 3.3:Change in Number of Jobs Controlled Elsewhere (ACJ): Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 3.4: Change in Number of Jobs Conbrolled from other Districts (ECJ) 
Labor Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 3. 5: Change in Number of Jobs in Autonorrous Finns (DIAG): Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 3.6. A Classification of Types of Organizational Change: 
Labor Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 
1973-1981 
A - external takeover of local firm 
E - disintegration of b.t·anch plant to an autonomous firm 
C - closure of /layoffs in branch plant 
D - expansion of branch plant 
I - out-migration of HQ (leaving branch plant) 
F - in-migration of HQ to join branch plant 
H - out-migration of HQ (leaving nothing) 
G - in-migration of HQ as autonomous unit 
K - closing of autonomous firm 
L - opening/expansion of local firm 
P - decline of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
M - expansion of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
0 - movement of bra.nch plant out of region of HQ 
N - movement of branch plant into region with HQ 
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Figure 3.7a. All Major Control Links: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1981 
(number of jobs) 
->2900 --990-2000 -430-730 - 144-380 
Figure 3.7b. Major Control Links from Vienna: Labor Intensive 
Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1981. 
(.number of jobs) 
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Figure 3.7c. Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1981. 
(number of jobs) 
->2900 
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Figure 3. 8: External D:!pendency: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1981 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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4. CAPITAL INTENSIVE MANUFACTURING WITH UNSKILLED WORKERS 
This sector includes paper, electrical equipment, iron and 
steel, chemicals and plastics. 
4.1 Sectoral Characteristics 
These are the classical mature industries; in large part basic 
industries but also traditional consumer goods, which in several 
cases may be in the late stage of the product or profit cycle 
(Markusen, 1985). Like the sector discussed above, they are 
facing strong competition from the NICs. Those countries possess 
both cheap labor and natural resources; important production 
factors for both sectors. The higher capital requirements of this 
sector, however, mean that it is somewhat better protected. These 
industries also classically serve large markets with standardised 
products. Consequently, scale economies imply that maintaining or 
increasing market share is important in order to keep production 
costs competitive. Another important feature of this sector in 
Austria is that there is a high level of state ownership which 
would imply both slower changes and a certain degree of labor 
hoarding. This sector did lose employment (a decline from 250,559 
to 240,361 workers), but this is small by comparison to the labor 
intensive unskilled sector; perhaps because foreign competition 
is less and state enterprises are more important. 
High fixed capital also implies higher exit barriers and less 
geographic mobility. As a result, other restructuring strategies 
may be followed. Keeping the plant operating is more attractive, 
and rationalisation strategies leading to further scale economies 
are likely. This in turn leads to stronger competition among 
Austrian firms, in the course of which the stronger enterprises 
might take over the weaker ones in order to maintain or increase 
their market share, increasing further the already large sizes of 
enterprises. Indeed this sector, with the highest share of exter-
nally controlled employment in 1973 (29.1%), further increased 
its share to 30.7% by 1981. In the course of this restructuring 
spatial factors play a less important role than in the previous 
sector. An exception to this is the fact that these enterprises -
because of their size - establish a certain internal division of 
labor whereby they tend to concentrate key entrepreneurial func-
tions in the urban agglomerations. 
In the state owned enterprises this trend toward increasing 
concentration and centralization persisted throughout the sixties 
and seventies. It has changed, however, in the 1980s because the 
internal division of labor attempted, a specialization according 
to entrepreneurial function, turned out to be inefficiently 
organized. Consequently, there has since been an effort to make 
the plants more autonomous and to establish smaller and more 
flexible enterprises. Also relocations of headquarters from 
Vienna to production plants outside have occurred (e.g. in the 
case of VEW/united special steel works). These latter processes, 
however, cannot be investigated with our data set. 
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4.2 The Geography of Control in 1973 
In 1973 the main areas of external control were the Mur-
Murz-Furche and the southern Wiener Becken (Vienna Basin; Figure 
4.1). These are the traditional locations of basic industry which 
were gradually taken over by larger corporations, particularly 
state enterprises, achieving external control through mergers 
rather than by branch plant establishment. Further highly cont-
rolled areas are central parts of Burgenland and parts of the 
Wald- und Weinviertel (northwest and northeast, respectively, of 
Vienna). These may be locations of branch plants established in 
the periphery by the electrical industry in the late 1950s and 
1960s. Vienna was the dominant center of control with the only 
other significant center of control being located in Linz (Figure 
4.2). Vienna controls 77.5% of all externally controlled jobs and 
Linz 16.4%. While Vienna contains the headquarters of some state 
owned industries and private sector electrical industries, Linz 
is the headquarters of two major state owned industries (VOEST, 
Chemie Linz). 
4.3 Changes in the Geography of Control 1973-1981 
Vienna and Linz showed contrasting trends between 1973 and 
1981 with Vienna losing control over 3175 jobs (declining to a 
72.2% share) and Linz gaining 1329 jobs (increasing its share to 
17.9%; Figure 4.3). Other places showing a significant increase 
of control were Deutschlandsberg, Braunau, St.Veit and Melk. This 
pattern reflects organizational shifts in some large companies 
such as Siemens or AMAG which created more autonomous and legally 
independent firms. 
The changes in the areas under highest control in 1973 (Fi-
gures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6) are closely related to whether those areas 
were dominated by control from Linz or from Vienna. 
An increase in external control combined with a decline in 
local control occurred in Liezen, Leoben, Murzzuschlag and 
Graz. The first three districts were dominated by control from 
Linz. 
By contrast there was a decline in external control and an 
increase of local control in Bruck/Mur, Judenburg, Murau, 
Wiener Neustadt and St.Felten. These had been all controlled 
principally from Vienna. 
The result is that neighbouring districts in the old indus-
trial region (Mur-Murz-Furche) show very different trends; 
probably the result of contrasting policies of firms headquar-
tered in Linz as compared to those in Vienna. A possible explana-
tion of this would be that most of the employment controlled from 
Linz is in state enterprises which were reacting more slowly to 
external pressure; continuing to maintain employment levels and 
follow traditional practices of takeovers and mergers. By cont-
rast, ownership headquartered in Vienna is more diversified among 
public and private firms, and thus is generally more responsive 
to external pressure. Viennese firms may then have reacted to 
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pressures for restructuring by disintegration strategies similar 
to these discussed for the labor intensive unskilled sector. 
In general, prior to 1981 the intensity of restructuring was 
less in this sector than in labor intensive, unskilled indust-
ries. This reflects the nature of the sector (less pressure from 
NICs; high exit barriers), and the labor hoarding policies of 
state owned enterprises. During this period, the general direc-
tion of restructuring has been a shif of control from Vienna to 
Linz and other secondary centers (Figure 4.7), as well as conti-
nued integration and expansion of external control (Figure 4.8). 
Since 1981, it is likely that drastic employment reduction in 
state enterprises such as VOEST and Chemie Linz have reversed at 
least the former of these two trends by reducing the importance 
of Linz as a center of control. 
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Figure 4.1: External Dependency: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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Figure 4.2a All Major Control Links: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 4. 2b Major Control Links from Vienna: Capital Intensive Manufacturing 
with Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 4.2c Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 4.3: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled Elsewhere (ACJ): Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 4.4: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled from other Districts (ECJ): 
Capital Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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FFigure 4.5: Change in Number of Jobs in Autonorrous Finns (DIAG): Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 4.6. A Classification of Types of Organizational Change: 
Capital Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 
1973-1981 
A - external takeover of local firm 
E - disintegration of branch plant to an autonomous firm 
C - closure of /layoffs in branch plant 
D- expansion of branch plant 
I - out-migration of HQ (leaving branch plant) 
F - in-migration of HQ to join branch plant 
H- out-migration of HQ (leaving nothing) 
G - in-migration of HQ as autonomous unit 
K - closing of autonomous firm 
L - opening/expansion of local firm 
P - decline of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
M - expansion of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
0 - movement of branch plant out of .region of HQ 
N - movement of branch plant into region with HQ 
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Figure 4.7a. All Major Control Links: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1981 
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Figure 4.7c. Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Unskilled Workers, 1981. 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 4.8: External Dependency: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Unskilled Workers, 1981 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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5. LABOR INTENSIVE MANUFACTURING WITH SKILLED WORKERS 
This sector includes wood products, sports and recreational 
equipment, transportation equipment, optical instruments, and 
metal products. It should be noted that the transportation 
equipment sector, dominated by the firm Steyr-Puch, is rather 
different from other sectors included here, and will be therefore 
treated separately in the analy~is. Fortunately the size of this 
firm makes it easy to identify in the data analysed. 
5.1 Sectoral Characteristics 
The employment of relatively skilled labor in this sector has 
served to insulate it better from foreign competition. Indeed, of 
all four manufacturing sectors this is the one likely to be under 
least external competitive pressure, meaning that a slower rate 
of restructuring is to be expected. This sector is also characte-
rized by well organized and well established craft unions, acting 
as a strong resistance to efforts of employers to reduce the 
labor force. 
These factors contributing to the stability of the sector are 
counteracted by the general lack of fixed capital which makes 
entry and exit barriers relatively low. In addition, the lower 
fixed capital would imply lower economies of scale and less 
pressure for centralization of firms into larger companies in 
order to maintain market share and lower production costs. As a 
consequence, given the relative prosperity of this sector, a 
significant number of births of new firms would be expected. 
Furthermore, already existant firms are more likely to remain 
independent. 
The locational consequences of these characteristics are that 
production facilities will be attracted to larger agglomerations 
and to locations which already have a long tradition of skilled 
work in the industry concerned. There would be less of an inter-
nal spatial division of labor within the enterprises, both 
because the skilled labor is more likely to be found in those 
locations which are also attractive for administrative and 
control activities, and because the firms are smaller and have 
been less susceptible to the automation of production processes 
and their decentralization to locations of cheap labor. 
The exception to this is Steyr-Puch, a capital intensive and 
highly centralized state enterprise manufacturing transportation 
equipment, with its headquarters in Vienna and with principal 
manufacturing plants in Steyr and Graz. Because of its excepti-
onal structure and state ownership, rather different economic and 
structural changes would be expected in this case. 
As a result of these general sectoral characteristics, the 
greater flexibility of low entry and exit barriers is counter-
acted by less external pressure, by labor union resistance to 
rationalization, and by the labor hoarding policies of the state 
enterprise. As a result, between 1973 and 1981 total employment 
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increased slightly from 227,245 to 233,274 workers (a 3% in-
crease) in the sector as a whole. 
With the exception of the transport industry, the continued 
heavy use of skilled labor implies that this sector has resisted 
automation at least prior to 1973. There is a potential and a 
strong incentive for further automation, however, since some 
skilled processes become amenable to being routinised under the 
newly developing technologies, and because the high expenditures 
on labor make the cost cutting potential of such innovations 
considerable. If successful, this technical change would imply 
either a deskilling of the labor force and a reduction of the 
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor, or a retraining of some of 
the skilled labor to operate the new equipment. Such technolo-
gies, because of their ability to reduce the production cost 
advantages of large manufacturing establishments, will support 
the competitiveness of small firms. 
The low entry and exit barriers, the lower and perhaps decrea-
sing scale economies, and the opportunities provided by the new 
technologies together imply that overall the pressure to inte-
grate production is not strong. This is further reinforced by the 
lack of external pressure for restructuring. Indeed the propor-
tion of all jobs in this sector which were externally controlled 
was already low in 1973 (15%), and fell further to 14% by 1981; 
the lowest value for any manufacturing sector. If Steyr-Puch is 
excluded from the sector, these percentages fall to 9% in 1973 
and 7% in 1981, which are the lowest levels of external control 
in any of the six sectors examined here. This sector is, there-
fore, dominated by autonomous enterprises. 
5.2 The Geography of Control in 1973 
The districts subject to highest levels of external control in 
1973 were located in the Alpine foreland and the southern Vienna 
basin, together with selected districts in the old industrial 
area of upper Styria and in the Waldviertel (Figure 5.1). These 
are mainly traditional industrial areas with a history of a 
skilled workforce; where older firms have been gradually pur-
chased by larger enterprises headquartered in Vienna. Vienna is 
the only significant center of control, controlling 85% of all 
externally controlled jobs in this sector. Almost one half of 
these are associated with Steyr-Puch in Steyr and Graz (40% of 
all controlled jobs) representing the dominant organizational 
linkages (Figure 5.2). 
5.3 Changes in the Geography of Control 1973-1981 
The dominance of Vienna as a center of control fell markedly 
during this period (Figure 5.3), losing 5700 jobs. Despite this, 
the number of externally controlled jobs in the districts where 
Steyr-Puch plants are located actually increased (Figure 5.4), by 
a total of 1000 employees. Integration and/or employment thus 
apparently increased in Steyr-Puch, reflecting on the one hand 
its more capital intensive structure and on the other hand state 
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directed labor hoarding policies similar to those observable in 
the capital intensive, unskilled labor sector. 
The rest of the sector shows dramatically different behavior. 
The above calculations imply that the number of jobs controlled 
out of Vienna in the other industries of this sector fell by 
approximately 6,700 jobs, or by 9%. Most of the districts which 
were controlled from Vienna in 1973 were no longer controlled 
from there in 1981, undergoing a shift from external control to 
local control (Figures 5.5, 5.6). This is true of St Polten, 
Neunkirchen, Amstetten, Kirchdorff a.d. Krems, Furstenfeld and 
Murzuschlag. This is an indicator of decentralization of control 
out of Vienna, and the disintegration of larger enterprises to 
create legally independent entities (Figure 5.7). These changes 
are similar to, but less dramatic than, changes observed in parts 
of the unskilled, labor intensive sector. Also as in that sector, 
the branch plants formerly controlled from Vienna in the northern 
Waldviertel (northwest of Vienna) were closed rather than disin-
tegrated. This is further evidence of a general economic decline 
in this area, affecting plants even in those manufacturing 
sectors which were performing relatively well. 
At the same time, the amount of control significantly in-
creased in Salzburg; and to a lesser degree in Braunau (near 
Salzburg), Wels, Krems, and Lillienfeld. The increased control 
from the Salzburg area extended into the Vienna basin (Vienna, 
Medling and Neunkirchen; Figure 5.7b). This may be a result of 
the locational advantage of Salzburg as a gateway to West German 
and European Community markets, particularly as the headquarters 
of industries under less foreign competition and perhaps seeking 
export markets. 
While patterns of decentralization, organizational disinte-
gration and plant closure are similar to those in the other labor 
intensive sector, reflecting the influence of the labor intensive 
structure on organizational strategies, there are important 
differences between the two. In particular, whereas the unskilled 
sector is restructuring in a phase of decline, the skilled sector 
is undoubtedly doing so in a period of growth; increasing produc-
tivity and increasing employment. These changes are characterized 
by the dominance of new firm formation and organizational disin-
tegration over centralization and mergers, with the single 
exception of Steyr-Puch. This can be seen in the general decline 
of external dependency with the exception of Graz and Steyr 
(Figures 5.8, 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1: External Dependency: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1973 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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Figure 5.2: All Major Control Links: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1973 
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Figure 5. 3: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled Elsewhere (ACJ): Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973-1981 
r::-:::-:::·>:)l 
{= -300.00 
lr::t:\'}J 
> -300.00 
<= -100.00 
mliffin 
> -100.0t1 
<= 0.~10 
> 0.00 
<= 100.(10 
fifli;\UM 
> 100.00 
<= 300 .13ft 
-> 30tUl0 
Figure 5.4: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled from other Districts (ECJ): 
Labor Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 5. 5: Change in Number of Jobs in Autonorrous Firms (DIAG): Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 5.6. A Classification of Types of Organizational Change: 
Labor Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 
1973-1981 
A - external takeover of local firm 
E - disintegration of branch plant to an autonomous firm 
C - closure of /layoffs in branch plant 
D - expansion of branch plant 
I - out-migration of HQ (leaving branch plant) 
F - in-migration of HQ to join branch plant 
H - out-migration of HQ (leaving nothing) 
G - in-migration of HQ as autonomous unit 
K - closing of autonomous firm 
L - opening/expansion of local fi.t'm 
P - decline of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
M - expansion of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
0 - movement of branch plant out of region of HQ 
N - movement of branch plant into region with HQ 
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Figure S.7a. All Major Control Links: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1981 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure S.7b. Major Control Links from Vienna: Labor Intensive 
Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1981. 
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Figure 5.7c. Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Labor 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1981. 
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Figure 5.8: External Dependency: Labor Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1981 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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6. CAPITAL INTENSIVE MANUFACTURING WITH SKILLED WORKERS 
This sector includes oil refining, 
ducts, food manufacturing, machinery, 
printing and publishing. 
stone, 
metal 
clay, glass pre-
processing, and 
6.1 Sectoral Characteristics 
This is a rather heterogenous sectoral group making genera-
lizations difficult. However, we would expect the following, 
given the factor mix associated with these industries. The higher 
intensity of both capital and also skilled labor suggest that 
external pressure from NICs would be lower. Furthermore a number 
of industries in this sector are dependent on market accessibili-
ty, both because of their relatively bulky products and for other 
reasons. This increases their protection from foreign competiti-
on. 
However, the capital intensity signifies greater maturity, a 
greater importance of scale economies, and higher exit barriers. 
As in the capital intensive unskilled sector, this would imply a 
situation of over-production, rationalization and strong competi-
tion among Austrian firms. Stronger enterprises are expected to 
takeover weaker ones thus increasing the level of centralization 
in the sector. Employment did decline, probably because of the 
productivity increases, from 313,648 to 298,110 between 1973 and 
1981 and the proportion of externally controlled jobs increased 
from 14.15 to 16.48%. 
The sector seems to be already well automated although some 
skilled labor is still necessary. New technology might allow the 
replacement of some of these skilled tasks by machinery. It may 
also lower the entry and exit barriers thus increasing the 
relative attractiveness of disintegration in the future. 
6.2 The Geography of Control in 1973 
The main areas of external control in 1973 were the southern 
Vienna Basin, northern Burgenland, selected districts in the Mur-
Milrz-Furche and districts close to Vienna (Figure 6.1). Vienna 
was the primary center of control (64.3% of all externally 
controlled jobs) and Linz was the secondary center (14.2%). This 
pattern (Figure 6.2) is possibly the result of two processes: The 
development of branch plants at locations accessible to the 
market of Vienna (in the cases of food, oil refining, printing 
and publishing, stone, clay, glass), and the taking over of older 
machinery and metal processing plants in the traditional indust-
rial belt of upper Styria. 
6.3 Chan es in of Control 1973-1981 
This is the only 
an increase in the 
the overall increase 
share nevertheless 
urban centers (Linz, 
manufacturing sector for which Vienna shows 
number of controlled jobs (+645). Because of 
in the number of controlled jobs Vienna's 
falls from 64.3% to 59.4%. The other major 
Graz, Salzburg) all increased their share of 
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external control, with the greatest increase being in Graz 
(Figure 6.3). Krems, and to some extent Scharding, also showed 
noticeable increases, and there was also some increase in dist-
ricts around Linz (Urfahr-Umgebung, Wels). The only noticeable 
district to lose control was St.Veit. The pattern of control in 
general shows strong stability. The general increase in external 
control from all major cities reflects the process of centraliza-
tion to maintain scale economies described above. The marked 
relative shift in the locus of control away from Vienna reflects 
the stagnation of Vienna as a market, with economic activities 
and population moving to other faster growing urban areas to the 
west. 
The districts showing marked changes in external control can 
be divided into four scenarios(Figures 6.4, 6.5, 6.6): 
Further expansion or opening 
under external control from 
Linz, Salzburg, Liezen). Most 
between Vienna and Linz. 
of branch plants, in all cases 
Vienna (Korneuburg, Amstetten, 
of these districts are located 
A shift from external control to legally independent plants. 
These districts, located either in the Wr.Becken or southern 
Styria, were also dominated in 1973 by control from Vienna 
(Bruck/Leitha, Medling, Deutschlandsberg, Leibnitz). 
Closure of branch plants (Wr.Neustadt, 
schlag, Bruck/Mur). These districts form 
representing the north-eastern part of 
areas" of Lower Austria and Styria. Again 
controlled from Vienna. 
Neunkirchen, Milrzzu-
a continous region 
the "old industrial 
they were formerly 
External takeover of local firms (Leoben, Judenburg, Spittal, 
Klagenfurt). These districts are located either in upper 
Styria (Mur-Murz-Furche) or Carinthia, and are controlled from 
different districts. 
Together, these scenarios add up to a change in the locations 
where branch plants are to be found that are controlled from 
Vienna (Figures 6.2b, 6.7b). Branch plants in old industrial 
areas south of Vienna and upper Styria, possibly engaged in metal 
processing, are being closed or taken over locally. The closure 
of branch plants reflects the general economic stagnation there 
and perhaps the decline of related industries such as iron and 
steel. By contrast, there are expansions of branch plants in 
cities along the highway connecting Vienna to Salzburg and the 
European Community; an area wich has generally a better accessi-
bility to markets. This is likely to be a result of expansion in 
those capital intensive, skilled industries where accessibility 
is important; as well as a transfer of some metal processing from 
upper Styria to the Linz area where the steel industry (VOEST) is 
concentrated, and during this period was being protected (section 
4). Other multi-regional enterprises were integrating their 
activities through the purchase of local firms (Figure 6.7). This 
component shows no clear locational pattern, but is more likely 
to be due to particular features of certain plants, such as 
financial viability and the age of production equipment. General-
ly, the geographical configuration of external dependency shows 
no general trends (Figures 6.8, 6.1). 
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Figure 6 .1: External Dependency: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1973 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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Figure 6.2b Major Control Links from Vienna: Capital Intensive Manufacturing 
with Skilled Workers, 1973 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 6.2c Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973 
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Figure 6. 3: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled Elsewhere (ACJ): Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 6.4: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled from other Districts (ECJ): 
Capital Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 6.5: Change in NUmber of Jobs in Autonorrous Finns (DIAG): Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1973-1981 
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Figure 6.6. A Classification of Types of Organizational Change: 
Capital Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 
1973-1981 
A - external takeover of local firm 
E - disintegration of branch plant to an autonomous firm 
C - closure of/layoffs in branch plant 
D - expansion of branch plant 
I - out-migration of HQ (leaving branch plant) 
F - in-migration of HQ to join branch plant 
H - out-migration of HQ (leaving nothing) 
G - in-migration of HQ as autonomous unit 
K - closing of autonomous firm 
L - opening/expansion of local firm 
P - decline of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
M - expansion of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
0 - movement of branch plant out of region of HQ 
N - movement of branch plant into region with HQ 
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Figure 6.7a. All Major Control Links: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1981 
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Figure 6.7b. Major Control Links from Vienna: Capital Intensive 
Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1981 . 
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Figure _6.7c. Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Capital 
Intensive Manufacturing with Skilled Workers, 1981. 
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Figure 6. 8: External Dependency: Capital Intensive Manufacturing with 
Skilled Workers, 1981 
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7. RETAIL TRADE, WHOLESALING 
7.1 Sectoral Characteristics 
In general, service industries can be analysed by examining 
the production process. They differ in several significant ways 
from manufacturing sectors. These differences are in the nature 
of the commodity produced, in the production methods used, and in 
the locational requirements of these industries. The commodity 
produced is less often a tangible product. Retailing and whole-
saling, for example, essentially produce accessibility for 
commodities produced in other sectors; making them accessible to 
households. This service is a commodity that is directly consumed 
when and where it is produced. For wholesaling, unlike retailing, 
accessibility is with respect to manufacturers and retailers and 
is dominated by access to transport facilities. 
The nature of the product influences the production processes 
used. Retailing in particular is traditionally a labor intensive 
activity, although the labor may be skilled or unskilled. Both 
retailing and wholesaling have traditionally been difficult 
processes to routinize and have been resistent to methods of 
automation. Finally, the nature of the product dictates that 
accessibility to the consumer is a major locational requirement, 
with the degree of accessibility depending on the range and 
threshold of the service. The variety of ranges and thresholds 
and the direct or indirect importance of access to the spatially 
widely distributed population of households, and the agglomera-
tion economies of urban areas, together imply that a hierarchical 
central place location pattern is to be expected. The need for 
consumer services to be within range of consumers, however, 
implies that scale economies are harder to achieve. For these 
reasons production facilities will be widely distributed in 
space. 
The demand for many, particularly high order and less fre-
quently purchased, consumer goods is relatively unpredictable. 
The necessity of a spatially decentralized production system, the 
difficulty of applying fordist production methods, and the 
unpredictability of demand all suggest that there would be less 
centralization in this sector than in manufacturing sectors. This 
would be especially true for high order services. 
The new technologies for automation and for coordinating 
decentralized production systems could, however, have a signifi-
cant impact in this sector. Coordinating decentralized production 
is the key to mergers and acquisitions in a sector where produc-
tion must remain spatially widely dispersed. Furthermore, retai-
ling and wholesaling may prove amenable to flexible automation 
systems. For example, universal product codes (UPC) have made 
stock taking and price changing much less labor intensive, and 
increasing standardization of packaging makes handling of pro-
ducts by machine easier. In addition, shopping behavior has 
gradually shifted in favor of larger stores with a greater 
variety of products and lower prices. Overall, the proportion of 
jobs in the sector which were externally controlled was indeed 
low in 1973 (11.5%), rising to 15.2% by 1983, suggesting a 
tendency toward integration. 
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Because of the nature of consumer services, there is little 
direct competition from foreign producers. External competition 
has an important indirect effect, however, since it affects 
employment in other sectors which in turn influences final demand 
for consumer services. This will again be particularly the case 
for high order services, which are generally a less necessary 
component of the basic wage. Jobs in this sector declined by 1% 
from 442,469 to 439,458 jobs between 1973 and 1981, in part due 
to stagnation of demand and in part due to integration and 
rationalization. 
7.2 The Geography of Control in 1973 
The strongly decentralized pattern of control for this sector 
distinguishes itself from all other sectors (Figure 7.1) Vienna 
controls only 39.7% of the low proportion of jobs that are 
externally controlled, and the three secondary centers of the 
urban system (Linz, controlling 8%; Salzburg, 8%; and Graz,7%) 
all control significant numbers of jobs. Even third order centers 
such as Wels, St Polten, Leoben, Klagenfurt and Innsbruck are 
moderately important. Other third order centers such as Krems and 
Wiener Neustadt are, however, less important perhaps because 
their hinterlands are within range of Vienna, the highest order 
central place (Figure 7.2). 
In general the pattern of control strongly reflects the 
Austrian central place hierarchy. This is also true of the high 
levels of dependency in the secondary centers despite the jobs 
they control. Such a pattern is also to be found in the way that 
high order centers provide high order goods to medium order 
centers, whereas medium and low order goods are provided by the 
latter centers to their hinterlands. 
In 1973 the level of external control was generally rather low 
in much of Austria, with the single exception of the Mur-Murz-
Furche region; the old industrial region of Styria. Several 
factors probably have contributed to high external control here. 
First, as a traditional district with an industrial working class 
there is a long standing demand for non-agricultural consumer 
services, and probably a fairly predictable demand with little 
consumption of higher order goods where demand is more unpredic-
table. Thus the nature of demand here is fairly predictable, 
favoring centralization. The same is true for Vienna and Linz 
where there is also a higher degree of external control. Second, 
the socio-political mix of the area plays a role. As a working 
class population it has been traditionally well served by KONSUM, 
a retail chain headquartered in Vienna that was originally a 
working class consumer cooperative and continues to serve the 
working class. Finally, a lack of entrepreneurial initiative in 
this area may have left the local market open to extra-regional 
firms, which either opened their own affiliates in the face of 
relatively little competition or took over local firms. 
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7.3 Changes in the Geography of Control 1973-1981 
Between 1973 and 1981 the most pronounced change was the 
growth of Vienna as a center of control. Its proportion of all 
jobs controlled rose to 50.8% in a time when external control was 
generally markedly increasing. By contrast Leoben, an important 
center of control of jobs within Mur-Milrz-Furche in 1973, practi-
cally disappeared as a center of control. The secondary centers 
of the urban system also decreased their share, both in absolute 
and relative terms. Other centers, notably Klagenfurt, Innsbruck, 
St. Polten and Wels, showed some increase in control (Figure 
7. 3) . 
This was a period when incomes in Austria were generally 
growing slowly due to problems in the manufacturing sector. As a 
result, consumer services experienced stagnating sales. In 
addition, new technologies made significant inroads in this 
sector; substituting capital, in the form of sales area, for 
salesworkers. These technologies also made close coordination 
between spatially separated operations easier, in turn reducing 
both response times to fluctuating demand and the size of inven-
tories that had to be kept (a major cost in this sector). This 
allowed for more centralized management of sales. In short, 
stagnating demand created pressure for restructuring and ratio-
nalization, and new technologies enabled this to be achieved via 
increased integration and geographical concentration of control. 
In the case of wholesaling in particular, larger multi-regional 
enterprises could also benefit from scale economies in transpor-
tation costs during a period when gasoline prices were booming 
and the size of trucks was increasing. 
Significant shifts in the geography of control (Figures 7.4, 
7.5, 7.6) reflect changing relationships between central places 
and their hinterlands. In Klagenfurt and Innsruck, both relative-
ly isolated from Vienna, there was an expansion of local control 
by these centers over their own hinterlands. Both centers thus 
increased their control, while hinterland locations increased 
their degree of local dependency (cf. Figures 7.7f, 7.lf). 
Such regional concentration and centralization processes were 
in turn overlaid by national processes. Thus Leoben almost 
completely lost its hinterland to Vienna. This probably reflects 
the fact that during this period Mur-Murz-Furche suffered a 
stagnation of demand that was greater than in other areas of 
Austria because of economic problems in the manufacturing sector 
here (discussed earlier). The restructuring made necessary by 
this led to the closure of branch plants and by the shift of 
organizational control of the remaining branch plants to Vienna. 
Only in Judenburg was there a devolution of control of a branch 
plant to become legally independent (Figures 7.5, 7.6). 
The agglomerations themselves are also dominated by the 
external takeover of local autonomous firms during this period 
(in Salzburg, Linz, Graz, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, Villach and 
Wiener Neustadt; Figure 7.4). In the case of some of these cities 
(Linz, Graz, Villach and Wiener Neustadt) there was also a loss 
of headquarter functions (Figure 7.3). Thus within the upper 
levels of the central place hierarchy there was a centralization 
of control towards Vienna. 
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There was, however, a growth of autonomous firms in smaller 
cities close to Vienna (such as Korneuburg, Tulln, Eisenstadt and 
St Pol ten); Linz (Wels); Salzburg (Hallein); Innsbruck (Schwaz 
and Kufstein); and Graz (Deutschlandsberg), and in the Vorarlberg 
region (Figure 7.5). This is perhaps a result of the growth of 
the urban populations of the larger cities and their expansion 
into neighboring districts. 
In general this was a period of strong centralizaton of 
organizational control in this sector, in favor of Vienna as well 
as some more isolated lower level central places in regions with 
increasing population (Tyrol and Carinthia; Figure 7.7). This 
reflects both sectoral characteristics and the impact of changing 
technologies in a period of stagnating demand for consumer 
services. It has led to a broad scale increase of external 
dependency within Austria (Figure 7.8). 
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Figure 7. 1 : External Dependency: Retailing and Wholesaling, 19 7 3 
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Figure 7.2a. All Major Control Links: Retailing and Wholesaling, 1973 
(.number of jobs) 
- >3000 --7'0-2200 - 201-,,0 -14-200 
Figure 7.2b . Major Control Links from Vienna: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1973. 
(number of jobs) 
- >3000 --1,0-2200 - 201-,,0 -- 14-200 
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Figure 7.2c. Major ConLrol Links from Salzburg: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1973. 
(number of jobs) 
- >3000 
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Figure 7.2d. Major Control Links from Linz: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1973. 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 7.2e. Major Control Links from Graz: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1973. 
(.number of jobs) 
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Figure 7.3: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled Elsewhere (ACJ): Retailing 
and Wholsaling, 1973-1981 
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Figure 7. 4: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled frcm other Districts (ECJ) : 
Retail and Wholsaling, 1973-1981 
Figure 7. 5: Change in Number of Jobs in Autonorrous Finns (DIAG) : 
Retailing and Wholsaling, 1973-1981 
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Figure 7.6. A Classification of Types of Organizational Change: 
Retailing and Wholesaling, 1973-1981 
A - external takeover of local firm 
E - disintegration of branch plant to an autonomous firm 
C - closure of/layoffs in b1·anch plant 
D - expansion of branch plant 
I - out-migration of HO (leaving branch plant) 
F - in-migration of HQ to join branch plant 
H - out-migration of HQ Cleaving nothing) 
G - in-migration of HQ as autonomous unit 
K - closing of autonomous firm 
L - opening/expansion of local firm 
P - decline of cont1·01led branch plant employment outside region 
M - expansion of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
0 - movement of branch plant out of region of HQ 
N - movement of branch plant into 1·egion with HQ 
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Figure 7.7a. All Major Control Links: Retailing and Wholesaling, 1981 
(number of jobs) 
->3000 
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Figure 7.7b. Major Control Links from Vienna: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1981. 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 7.7c. Major Control Links from Salzburg: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1981. 
(number of jobs) 
->3000 
-- 750-2200 - 201-550 --84-200 
Figure 7.7d. Major Control Links from Linz: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1981. 
(number of jobs) 
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--84-200 
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Figure 7.7e. Major Control Links from Graz: Retailing and Wholesaling, 
1981. 
(number of jobs) 
->3000 
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-84-200 
Figure 7.7f. Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna, Salzburg, 
Linz, Graz: Retailing and Wholesaling, 1981. 
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Figure 7. 8: External Dependency: Retailing and Wholsaling, 19 81 
(externally controlled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
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8. BANKING, INSURANCE, PRODUCER SERVICES 
8.1 Sectoral Characteristics 
This sector contains two rather different groups of activi-
ties: In the producer services there are generally low entry and 
exit barriers because of low capital cost and few scale econo-
mies. Many small firms offer services to their clients which are 
very often custom designed. Due to the increasing division of 
labor and specialization of the economy there has been a general 
increase of the importance of information related activities 
(gathering, processing and distributing information) and conse-
quently there was a strong growth of these services. 
The banking and insurance industries on the other hand consist 
of a few large enterprises offering more standardised products. 
There are significant scale economies and "network savings" 
(advantages of a well developed locational network). In addition, 
since all transactions involve financial and information flows, 
there are low physical transport costs except for the consumer 
obtaining money. These factors favor a geographical dispersal of 
establishments but at the same time an organizational integrati-
on, a development which has been strongly supported by the new 
information technology. Because of the greater level of standar-
dization of services and administrative processes, and the highly 
standardized and flexible nature of the product, there is more 
scope for automation both in the offices and in contact with 
consumers (e.g. automatic bank tellers, credit cards). These 
developments might imply a smaller employment growth and even 
reductions in the future. 
There was strong employment growth for the sector in general, 
from 129,589 in 1973 to 170,514 in 1983: a growth rate of 31.58%. 
There was not a single district with a decreasing number of jobs, 
indicating the general expansion in this sector. Externally 
controlled jobs grew even faster than locally controlled ones, 
increasing their share from 15.01% to 16.35%. It should be noted 
that there was a considerable expansion in market penetration and 
in the number of affiliated branches by banking and insurance 
companies during this period. 
8.2 The Geography of Control in 1973 
In 1973 the areas of external control were mainly such secon-
dary urban centers as St. Polten, Krems, Wr.Neustadt, Eisenstadt, 
Graz, Leoben, Klagenfurt, Bregenz, and Dornbirn. Additionally 
high shares of externally controlled jobs can be found in the 
districts of Mattersburg, Horn and Spittal (Figure 8.1). The 
concentration of external control in secondary urban centers 
reflects the location there of regional branches providing middle 
order functions to the local area concerned. The relatively low 
external control in rural areas might be because threshold demand 
for even middle order functions could not be achieved, while 
other functions were provided by individuals in rural areas. 
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Vienna is by far the most important center of control. More 
than 80% of all externally controlled jobs (15,619) are con-
trolled from Vienna. Of the other centers of control (Salzburg, 
Linz, Graz, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck), all have less than 1,000 
jobs, and only Salzburg is of more than regional importance. 
While Salzburg controls a significant number of jobs in Vienna, 
Graz, Wiener Neustadt and Klagenfurt, the control originating 
from Linz is mostly restricted to its hinterland of upper Austria 
(Figure 8.2). Vienna's high degree of control in 1973 is a result 
of the high concentration of the nationally organized sectors 
(banks and insurance) there. In addition, Vienna is very attrac-
tive as a location for larger and more specialized producer 
service firms. Salzburg may be an emergerging center, because of 
its accessibility to the EEC and to Munich which is itself a 
center of information industries (software, electronics, etc.). 
8.3 Changes in the Geography of Control 1973-1981 
The changes in this sector are somewhat blurred by the heavy 
growth it experiences. Throughout the urban centers (Vienna, 
Salzburg, Graz, Linz, Villach, Bregenz, Dornbirn, Innsbruck) 
independent firms grew faster than branch plants (Figures 8.4, 
8.5). This might be due to rapid growth of some producer services 
caused by a fast growing demand in the presence of generally low 
entry costs, implying a high birth rate of new firms. Both new 
firm formation as well as expansion of existing independent firms 
are attracted to the agglomeration economies of larger cities. A 
relatively high growth rate of branch plant employment is found, 
however, in rural areas. Indeed the rate of growth of branch 
plant employment in rural areas generally exceeded that in the 
larger cities. This is in part due to the significant expansion 
of bank branches into rural areas in the 1970s, encouraged by the 
state. There is some indication that high costs led to the 
termination of this penetration policy of the banking firms in 
the 1980s. It is still the case in rural areas, however, that 
autonomous plants, because of their large share, contributed more 
than branch plant expansion to employment growth of this sector 
(Figure 8.6). 
With regard to headquarter functions, a strong growth occured 
in secondary urban centers (Graz, Linz, Salzburg) but also in 
some smaller places (Liezen, Spittal; Figure 8.3). In general 
there is an increasing interdependence within the urban system. 
Vienna still exerts strong control on all primary (Linz, Graz, 
Salzburg, Innsbruck, Bregenz, Klagenfurt) and secondary urban 
centers (St.Felten, Eisenstadt, Krems, Wr.Neustadt, Dornbirn, 
Wels, Villach etc.). However, by 1981 Salzburg, Graz and Linz 
themselves control a considerable number of jobs in Vienna, and 
organizational control among medium and large centers had streng-
thened significantly (Figures 8.7, 8.1); a trend also observable 
in retailing and wholesaling. The overall pattern of external 
dependency is concentrated in the same districts but has in-
creased by 1981 (Figure 8.8). 
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Figure 8.1: External Dependency: Banking, Insurance, Producer Services, 1973 
(externally oontrolled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
Figure 8.2a. All Major Control Links: Banking, Insurance, Producer 
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Figure 8.2b. Major Control Links from Vienna: Banking, Insurance, 
Producer Services, 1973. 
(number of jobs) 
- >2200 
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Figure 8.2c. Major Control Links Excluding Control from Vienna: Banking, 
Insurance, Producer Services, 1973. 
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Figure 8.3: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled Elsewhere (ACJ): Banking, 
Insurance, Producer Services, 1973-1981 
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Figure 8. 4: Change in Number of Jobs Controlled from other Districts (ECJ): 
Banking, Insurance, Producer Services, 1973-1981 
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Figure 8. 5: Change in Number of Jobs in Autonomous Finns (DIAG): 
Banking, Insurance, Producer Services, 1973-1981 
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Figure 8.6. A Classification of Types of Organizational Change: 
Finance, Insurance and Producer Services, 
1973-1981 
A - exte1·nal takeover of local ffrm 
E - disintegration of branch plant to an autonomous firm 
C - closure of /layoffs in branch plant 
D - expansion of bran eh plant 
I - out-migration of HQ (leaving branch plant) 
F - in-migration of HQ to join branch plant 
H - out-migration of HQ (leaving nothing) 
G - in-migration of HQ as autonomous unit 
K - closing of autonomous firm 
L - opening/expansion of local firm 
P - decline of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
M - expansion of controlled branch plant employment outside region 
0 - movement of branch plant out of region of HQ 
N - movement of branch plant into region with HQ 
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Figure 8.7a. All Major Control Links: Banking, Insurance, Producer 
Services, 1981 
(number of jobs) 
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Figure 8.7b. Major Control Links from Vienna: Banking, Insurance, 
Producet Services, 1981. 
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Figure 8.7c. Major Control .Links Excxluding Control from Vienna: Banking, 
Insurance, Producer Services, 1981 . 
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Figure 8.8: External Dependency: Banking, Insurance, Producer Services, 1981 
(externally oontrolled jobs as a proportion of all jobs) 
; .... · ·•: ....... i·:• .. :• .. :•,.:, .. :•· .:•1 
<= 0.10 
[:::.:.:.:.:.::~::::.,:~ 
/ ~. !IJ 
> 0. 2i:, 
< = !) .25 
0 ,~. 
<= 0.~e 
NM 
) 0.30 
- 80 -
9. SUMMARY 
During the 1950s and 1960s Austria experienced a spatial 
deconcentration of industry, mainly as a result of the establish-
ment of branch plants in rural areas. This resulted in a new 
spatial division of labor within large multilocational enterpri-
ses which was established in addition to the traditional concent-
ration of manufacturing jobs in the old industrial areas. The 
expanded scale of operation led to a spatial separation of 
production and control, using standardized technologies to take 
advantage of unskilled labor in the peripheral regions of Austria 
in producing for mass markets. 
Since the 1970'ies important changes of this "spatial division 
of labor" have occurred which were caused by the following 
macroeconomic and technological changes: 
An increase in the degree of international competition has 
occurred due to newly industrializing countries as well as the 
expansion of Japanese industry. 
Consumer demand in industrialized countries has become more 
sophisticated and differentiated. 
Rapid technological changes was occurring both with regard to 
production as well as to communication and information proces-
sing. 
These closely related developments put pressure for restructu-
ring on the Austrian economy in general and particularly on 
certain sectors. In the course of this restructuring also organi-
zational changes integration as well as disintegration processes 
have ocurred, which are reflected in spatial patterns as well. 
There are considerable sectoral differences (particularly with 
regard to the factor-intensity of sectors) in these organizatio-
nal changes which are due to differences in the pressure to 
restructure as well as entry/exit barriers and inertia due to 
fixed capital. 
The empirical analysis has shown the following main results: 
Labor i n tensive manufacturing with unskill e d wor kers (tex-
tiles, clothing, shoe manufacture, leather, wood processing) 
due to external competition has experinced the strongest 
pressure for restructuring as can be seen from the severe 
employment losses. Branch plant closure, spatial relocation as 
well as organisational disintegration have strongly reduced 
linkages of direct contol between Vienna and peripheral 
regions of Lower Austria and Burgenland. Other forms of 
control (financial control, subcontracting) which could not be 
investigated may have increased. 
Capital intensive manufacturing with unskilled workers (paper, 
chemicals and plastics, iron and steel, electrical equipment) 
also experienced a high pressure for restructuring but has 
higher exit barriers and less geographic mobility. Consequent-
ly other restructuring stratregies can be seen: Rationalisa-
tion and the need to increase scale economies has led to an 
even stronger concentration of this sector. In spatial terms 
- 81 -
enterprises headquatered in Linz have gained control whereas 
those in Vienna have lost. 
Labor intensive manufacturinq with skilled labor (metal 
products, wood products, optical instruments, transportation 
and sports equipment) experienced a slight increase in employ-
ment between 1973 and 1981. This resulted from less external 
pressure from foreign competition due to skill intensity, 
union resistence to rationalization and the labor hoarding 
policy of state enterprises. This sector is restructuring in a 
period of growth, increasing productivity and increasing 
employment. The level of external control, already low in 1973 
due to low entry barriers, declines further, mainly due to 
Vienna loosing importance as a center of control. The overall 
dynamics of this sector are dominated by new firm formation 
and organizational disintegration. 
Capital intensive manufacturing with skilled workers (oil 
refining, machinery, printing and publishing) is formed by a 
rather heterogenous mix of sectors. Besides the advantages of 
high skill intensity this sector also operates under high 
entry and exit barriers due to capital intensity. In this 
sector the number of externally controlled jobs increases. 
Also out of Vienna slightly more jobs are controlled in 1981 
than in 1973. This concentration process emerges from rather 
different spatial patterns. These patterns aggregate up to 
increased organizational control between 1973 and 1981. 
Retail trade, wholesaling is a sector strongly dependent on 
the spatial distribution of population and other economic 
activities. So the spatial distribution of employment in this 
sector mainly reflects the central place hierarchy. Together 
with the type of "product" produced in this sector it leads to 
a strongly decentralized pattern of control, both in terms of 
the amount of control and the spatial distribution of control 
centers. Between 1973 and 1981, however, the retail trade and 
wholesaling sector experienced a period of increasing control, 
partly caused by computerization allowing a more centralized 
organization. Vienna, the central place with highest rank in 
Austria, strongly improved its position as a center of control 
while some second order cities lost importance. 
Banking, insurance and producer services is a sector with 
strong employment growth in the 1973-81 period. There was not 
a single district with a decreasing number of jobs in this 
sector. Organizational control was strongly dominated by 
Vienna in 1973. The only other center of control with national 
importance was Salzburg, probably because of its good accessi-
bility to the European market. Areas with high external 
control were mainly secondary urban centers. The strong 
employment growth in this sector was accompanied by increasing 
control and spatial interdependence. In general the sector was 
expanding into rural and peripheral areas. Secondary urban 
centers like Graz, Linz, Salzburg became important centers of 
control and gained control even in Vienna. As a result, 
organizational control among medium and large centers had 
strengthened significantly by 1981. 
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